Introduction
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission) is right to declare that refugees and asylum seekers are amongst the most vulnerable to human rights violations in the development and execution of counterterrorist measures. 1 States have not only used their immigration laws to arrest, detain, question and deport non-nationals suspected of being involved in terrorism, 2 but fear of terrorism has led states to declare a state of emergency and derogate from human rights treaties, enabling them to detain non-nationals in a manner that would normally breach their human rights.
The Commission's Report on Terrorism and Human Rights (Report) 3 is an important and comprehensive document outlining the current rights of states and protections available to refugees/asylum seekers within the InterAmerican System, in relation to counter terrorism measures. While it goes into detail about a non-national's right to liberty and security, humane treatment, fair trial and due process of law, it does not discuss whether the norm of non-refoulement is derogable. The right to non-refoulement, in the Inter-American system, is found within article 22 (8) of the American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR) 4 . Article 22 (8) states that 'In no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, regardless of whether or not it is his country of origin, if in that country his right to life or personal freedom is in danger of being violated because of his race, nationality, religion, social status, or political opinions.'
It is a major failing of the Report that it does not take into account the fact that in a climate of terrorist attacks, states are likely to declare a state of emergency and take measures to derogate from their duties under the ACHR and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM). If states are able to derogate from the norm of non-refoulement, then the rights outlined in the Report are of no practical importance to a refugee/asylum seeker. The right to non-refoulement is the gateway through which a refugee/asylum seeker can access all other rights. It is therefore important to determine the extent to which states, within the Inter-American system, can derogate from the norm of non-refoulement.
While the right to non-refoulement is not specifically stated to be nonderogable within the ACHR, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights the extent a norm of customary international law is based on a non-derogable right within a treaty, the norm itself is non-derogable. This means that those elements of the customary international law norm of non-refoulement that reflect non-derogable treaty rights are also non-derogable. This paper will elaborate on the following statements to support the assertion that the principle of non-refoulement is non-derogable within the Inter-American System:
• For those states that have ratified the 1951 Convention, the right to non-refoulement contained within article 33 is non-derogable, by virtue of the fact that any other interpretation would fall foul of article 27(1) and article 29 (b) ACHR;
• The customary international law right to non-refoulement is nonderogable under article 27 and article 29(d) ACHR;
• The right to non-refoulement is an integral part of each fundamental non-derogable right contained within article 27(2) ACHR and therefore non-derogable for as much as it is contained within them;
• To the extent that article 22(8) ACHR and article 27 ADRDM are essential to the full realisation of the non-derogable rights listed in article 27(2), they themselves are non-derogable.
Legal Framework Regarding Derogation within the Inter-American

System
Most human rights treaties contain a provision allowing a state to derogate from certain rights within that treaty in a state of emergency. Article 27 ACHR is the relevant provision that allows states to derogate not only from the ACHR, but has also been read into the ADRDM to allow states to derogate from that instrument as well 6 . Article 27 sets out a strict criteria that a state has to fulfil in order to be entitled to derogate. The Commission has stated that states have to satisfy the following test in order to derogate within the meaning of article 27:
'The ability of states to take measures derogating from protections under the human rights instruments to which they are bound is strictly governed by several conditions, which are in turn broadly regulated by the generally recognized principles of proportionality, necessity and non-discrimination. In order to consider that there is an emergency justifying suspension of rights, there must be an extremely grave situation of such a nature that there is a real threat to law and order or the security of the state, including an armed conflict, public danger, or other emergency that imperils the public order or security of a member state. Any suspension may only be for such time as is strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and may not be proclaimed for indefinite or prolonged periods. Any suspension may only be effectuated to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, and thereby precludes the unnecessary suspension of rights, the imposition of restrictions more severe than necessary, or the unnecessary extension of suspension to regions or areas not affected by the emergency. Any suspension of rights cannot entail discrimination of any kind on such grounds as race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin. Any suspension must be compatible with all of a member state's other obligations under international law.' 7 Article 27(2) also provides further limitations to a state's ability to derogate by asserting that certain rights can never be derogated from, including the right to life and humane treatment. Although the Commission has stated that article 27(2) ACHR enumerates all of the rights that may not be the subject of derogation, it should be noted that article 27(1) requires that any suspension of guarantees must not be 'inconsistent with that state's other obligations under international law'.
The Right of Non-Refoulement contained within International
Instruments
The right of non-refoulement is the cornerstone of international refugee protection. 'It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, that "common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law" to which the Preamble refers, were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State where there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed.
Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in the brief and general wording of Article 3 (art. 3), would plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendment of the Article, and in the Court's view this inherent obligation not to extradite also extends to cases in which the fugitive would be faced in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment proscribed by that Article (art. 3).'
From the jurisprudence outlined above, it can be deduced that the reason that non-refoulement is disallowed in relation to a person where there are substantial reasons for believing he would be subject to torture on his return, is because the prohibition of torture is a fundamental non-derogable norm. It follows that insofar as a right or prohibition is a fundamental norm, the corresponding right not to refoule someone when they would be in real danger of one of these norms being violated is similarly non-derogable. The obligation of a state to respect the fundamental rights of an individual, such as to life, liberty and personal integrity, limits its ability to act where this would place the individual at risk. Strict adherence to the principle of non-return is one way that such basic rights can be ensured. Therefore, the content of the human rights law element of the customary international law right of nonrefoulement includes the right not to be returned where any of an individual's fundamental human right norms would be violated.
While the refugee law element of the customary norm of non-refoulement is subject to the limitations contained within article 1F and article 33(2) of the 1951 Convention, the human rights law element of the customary right of nonrefoulement is an absolute right and not subject to any limitations regardless of whether a person is suspected of any involvement in terrorist acts 18 .
The Application of International Human Rights Instruments within the
Inter-American System
The Convention, however, and is therefore subject to its limitations. That is not to say though that the 1951 Convention is the only international instrument relevant to article 27 ADRDM; article 3 of CAT could also be applicable. (7) and (8) ACHR and article 27 ADRDM must similarly be non-derogable in order that such rights continue to be enforceable within the Inter-American System. Any other conclusion would have the practical effect of negating the prohibition on derogation from the 1951 Convention and CAT.
The Application of non-refoulement as Customary International Law within the Inter-American System
The principle of non-refoulement of refugees is now widely recognised as a . The customary norm of nonrefoulement can therefore be used to help inform the scope of the rights held within the ACHR and ADRDM, specifically article 22(7) and (8) ACHR and article 27 ADRDM.
Non-Derogability of the Customary International Law Norm of Non-
Refoulement
A state can only derogate from a treaty to the extent for which that is expressly allowed. to a state where they would be tortured is also a peremptory norm. In essence it is not so much that the human rights norm of non-refoulement is in and of itself peremptory, but the violation that it prevents is. A state may not therefore refoule an individual where any of these peremptory norms are in danger of being violated. The logical conclusion to draw is that the norm of non-refoulement is an integral part of those fundamental values that are already international peremptory norms.
Non -Derogability of the Human Rights Law Norm of NonRefoulement
It is suggested that the human rights element of non-refoulement is located . In its recent General Comment 31, the HRC specifically stated that 'the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed' 32 The right to non-refoulement is not just an inherent part of the prohibition on the use of torture however, but is also an integral part of all fundamental nonderogable rights within ADRDM and ACHR.
The Commission has already found, in the Haitian Centre for Human Rights 
Difference in Burden of Proof
The difference between the refugee law norm of non-refoulement and the would appear that they would enforce the right of non-refoulement in such a circumstance.
The Non-Derogability of Article 22(8) ACHR and article 27 ADRDM
The Court stated in its advisory opinion on Habeas Corpus in Emergency
Situations that 'Article 27(2) must be interpreted in good faith, keeping in mind the object and purpose of ACHR and the need to prevent a conclusion that could give rise to the suppression of the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised in ACHR or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for therein 37 '.
It went on to add that 'State Parties not only have the obligation to recognize and to respect the rights and freedoms of all persons, they also have the obligation to protect and ensure the exercise of such rights and freedoms by means of the respective guarantees, that is, through suitable measures that will in all circumstances ensure the effectiveness of these rights and freedoms.'
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.
It is suggested that the right of non-refoulement is such a guarantee against the violation of the rights and freedoms of all persons. Further, the right of non-refoulement is in an analogous position to that of judicial guarantees and, therefore, in that respect, non-derogable.
In its advisory opinion regarding Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency
39
, the Court accepted that even though the right of due process was not properly a 'judicial guarantee', it was necessary to enable the judicial guarantees to be effective within the context of article 27. The reason that judicial guarantees are non-derogable is because they are essential to ensure the protection of non-derogable rights 40 . Non-refoulement is similarly essential; without it persons could be returned to states where there was a real risk that their non-derogable rights would be violated. Following this reasoning, the right of non-refoulement, specifically article 22 (7) and (8) ACHR and article 27 ADRDM, should be non-derogable.
Conclusion
The principle of non-refoulement is the very foundation upon which all rights of refugees/asylum seekers stand. It is the gateway right that allows them access to all their other human rights within a state. Once a person is legally within the jurisdiction of a state, they are entitled to the full and free exercise of the rights and freedoms contained in the human rights instruments that state has ratified. This is what makes the norm of non-refoulement so crucial.
It is, as the Commission has recognised, a fundamental human right. In this context therefore it is vital that the norm of non-refoulement is recognised as non-derogable and more than that, as a very part of the fundamental norms it protects: life, liberty and humane treatment. This paper has attempted to elucidate the different ways in which it can be shown that the norm of nonrefoulement is non-derogable. While it is relatively straightforward to prove that the right to non-refoulement contained within international agreements is non-derogable, it is more difficult to contend that the customary law norm of non-refoulement is non-derogable in and of itself. There is however no customary international law derogation clause and as such you can not derogate from a norm of international customary law. While a norm of customary international law may be inherently limited, due to the fact that its 'foundation' treaty provision is derogable, the customary international law norm of non-refoulement has no such limitation. In fact to the extent that the customary international law norm goes beyond the 1951 Convention definition, it is still non-derogable insofar as it is an integral part of the nonderogable rights it protects.
The norm of non-refoulement is akin to the right to due process of law. It is an ancillary right whose value is found not in the right itself but in the rights it seeks to protect. It has been shown that the norm of non-refoulement in both its human rights and refugee law elements is non-derogable through a variety 
